AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware

Cybersecurity
Original release date: December 1, 2022 | Last revised: January 5, 2023
Summary Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: •
Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities . • Train users to
recognize and report phishing attempts . • Enable and enforce phishing-
resistant multifactor authentication. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory
(CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for
network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware
threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and
historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and
indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against
ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and
to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The FBI
and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing
this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated
with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party
reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021
FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware . Note:
While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no
indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the
Republic of Cuba. Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number
of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms
demanded and paid on the increase. This year, Cuba ransomware actors have
added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a
possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan
(RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors. FBI and CISA encourage
organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of
this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other
ransomware operations. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb .
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-335A.stix (STIX 148 kb). (Updated
December 12, 2022) AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.) Technical
Details Overview Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of
Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware , FBI has observed Cuba ransomware
actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical
infrastructure sectors : Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare
and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of
August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have: Compromised
101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.
Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom
payments. Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures As
previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the
following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in
multiple critical infrastructure sectors: Known vulnerabilities in commercial
software [T1190 ] Phishing campaigns [T1566 ] Compromised credentials [T1078 ]
Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [T1563.002 ] After gaining
initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems
through Hancitor —a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as
Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’
networks. Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs
and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from
victims.[1 ],[2 ] Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities
and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised
systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2 ] Cuba ransomware actors
have: Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS)
driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges. Used a PowerShell script
to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory
Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets
offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003 ]. Used a tool, called KerberCache, to
extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server
Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001 ]. Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472
(also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068 ].
This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor
and Qbot. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use
tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised
environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors,
“leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called
ApcHelper.sys . This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was
not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found
in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak.” [T1562.001 ].[2 ] In addition to deploying
ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they
exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2)
threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2 ] Cuba
Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace Since spring 2022,
third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between
Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware
actors: According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began
using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[2 ] Cuba
ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According
to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a
foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy
ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba
ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using
Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS
proxy via a C2 server [T1090 ]. Cuba ransomware actors initially used their
leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began
selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen
data.[2 ] RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT
companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3 ][4 ] The actors copied
legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then
incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001 ], which allowed the RomCom
actors to: Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for SolarWinds Network
Performance Monitor (NPM), KeePass password manager, PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF
Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and Advanced IP
Scanner software; Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage. INDICATORS OF
COMPROMISE See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained
during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to
these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in
detecting possible exploitation or compromise. Note: For IOCs as of early
November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba
Ransomware . Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late
August 2022 File Name File Path File Hash netping.dll c:\windows\temp SHA256:
f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c shar.bat MD5:
4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca SHA256:
a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c Psexesvc.exe
SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944 1.bat
216155s.dll 23246s.bat SHA256:
02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8 23246s.dll
SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f
23246st.dll SHA256:
f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710 259238e.exe
31-100.bat 3184.bat 3184.dll 45.dll SHA256:
857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583 4ca736d.exe
62e2e37.exe 64.235.39.82 64s.dll 7z.sfx 7zCon.sfx 7-zip.chm 82.ps1 9479.bat
SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0
9479p.bat SHA256:
f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a 9479p.ps1
SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17 a.exe
MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3 SHA1:
eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4 SHA256:
0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3 SHA256:
0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605 SHA256:
7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c SHA256:
af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02 a220.bat
a220.dll SHA256:
8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3 a82.exe
SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42
a91.exe SHA256:
3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce a99.exe
SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b
aa.exe aa2.exe aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com add2.exe advapi32.dll
agent.13.ps1 agent.bat SHA256:
fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975 agent.dll
agent13.bat agent13.ps1 SHA256:
1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b agent64.bin
SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1
agsyst121.bat agsyst121.dll all.bat SHA256:
ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a all.dll
SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4
anet.exe SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3 SHA256:
74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84 SHA256:
b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53 SHA256:
f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae App.exe
appnetwork.exe AppVClient.man aswSP_arPot2 aus.exe SHA256:
0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674 SHA256:
310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba av.bat
SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8
c2.ps1 c2.ps1 cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx check.exe checkk.exe checkk.txt SHA256:
1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f client32.exe
comctl32 .dll comp2.ps1 comps2.ps1 cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx defendercontrol.exe
ff.exe SHA256:
1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834 File
__agsyst121.dll File __aswArPot.sys File __s9239.dll File_agsyst121.dll
File_aswArPot.sys File_s9239.dll ga.exe gdi32 .dll geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx IObit
UNLOCKER.exe kavsa32.exe MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b SHA1:
9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722 kavsyst32.exe kernel32.dll komar.bat
SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB
komar.dll komar121.bat komar121.dll komar2.ps1 SHA256:
61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4 komar64.dll
SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B
mfcappk32.exe newpass.ps1 SHA256:
c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427 npalll.exe
SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906
ole32.dll oleaut32.dll open.bat SHA256:
2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676 open.exe
pass.ps1 SHA256:
0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666
pdfdecrypt.exe powerview.ps1 prt3389.bat SHA256:
e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed ra.ps1
SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8
rg1.exe Rg2.exe rundll32 s64174.bat SHA256:
10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2 SHA256:
1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79 s64174.dll
s9239.bat s9239.dll shell32.dll stel.exe syskav64.exe sysra64,exe
systav332.bat SHA256:
01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe TeamViewer.exe testDLL.dll tug4rigd.dll SHA256:
952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl user32.dll v1.bat v2.bat v3.bat veeamp.exe
SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732
version.dll vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx wininet.dll wlog.exe wpeqawzp.sys
y3lcx345.dll zero.exe SHA256:
3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0 Table 2: Cuba
Ransomware Associated Email Addresses, as of Late August 2022 Email Provider
Email Addresses Cuba-supp [.] com admin@cuba-supp[.]com Encryption-support [.]
com admin@encryption-support[.]com Mail.supports24 [.] net
inbox@mail.supports24[.]net Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber
Address, as of Late August 2022 cuba_support@exploit[.]im Table 4: IP
Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022 Note: Some
of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA
recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-
looking action such as blocking. 193.23.244[.]244 144.172.83[.]13
216.45.55[.]30 94.103.9[.]79 149.255.35[.]131 217.79.43[.]148 192.137.101[.]46
154.35.175[.]225 222.252.53[.]33 92.222.172[.]39 159.203.70[.]39
23.227.198[.]246 92.222.172[.]172 171.25.193[.]9 31.184.192[.]44 10.13.102[.]1
185.153.199[.]169 37.120.247[.]39 10.13.102[.]58 192.137.100[.]96
37.44.253[.]21 10.133.78[.]41 192.137.100[.]98 38.108.119[.]121 10.14.100[.]20
192.137.101[.]205 45.164.21[.]13 103.114.163[.]197 193.34.167[.]17
45.32.229[.]66 103.27.203[.]197 194.109.206[.]212 45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100 195.54.160[.]149 45.91.83[.]176 107.189.10[.]143
199.58.81[.]140 64.52.169[.]174 108.170.31[.]115 204.13.164[.]118
64.235.39[.]82 128.31.0[.]34 209.76.253[.]84 79.141.169[.]220 128.31.0[.]39
212.192.241[.]230 84.17.52[.]135 131.188.40[.]189 213.32.39[.]43 86.59.21[.]38
141.98.87[.]124 216.45.55[.]3 Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving
Payments, as of Late August 2022 bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv See figure 1 for an example of a
Cuba ransomware note. Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August
2022 Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were
compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can’t restore them without
our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss
of your data. Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded
all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from
you in the next 3 days we will public it in our news site. You can find it
there ( https[:]//
cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ ) Tor Browser is
needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ ) Also we respect your work
and time and we are open for communication. In that case we are ready to
discuss recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and
compliance with agreements by our side. Also we can provide all necessary
evidence to confirm performance of our products and statements. Feel free to
contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html ) Our ToxID:
37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271
Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net Mark your messages
with your personal ID: Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or
compromise: Palo Alto Networks Novel News on Cuba Ransomware: Greetings From
Tropical Scorpius BlackBerry blog RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and
SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom BlackBerry
blog Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian
Militaries MITRE ATT&CK; TECHNIQUES Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK;
techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table,
see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware .
Resource Development Technique Title ID Use Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
T1584.001 Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their
operations. Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Cuba
ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a
victim’s network. External Remote Services T1133 Cuba ransomware actors may
leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s
network. Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Cuba ransomware actors are
known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems. Phishing T1566 Cuba
ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to
systems. Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter:
PowerShell T1059.001 Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate
privileges. Software Deployment Tools T1072 Cuba ransomware actors use
Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network.
Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege
Escalation T1068 Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain
administrator privileges.[2 ] Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Impair
Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a
loader that disables security tools within the victim network. Lateral
Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking
T1563.002 Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally.
Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001 Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored
compromised credentials. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
T1558.003 Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify
service accounts linked to active directory.[2 ] Command and Control Technique
Title ID Use Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications T1090
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to
direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2 ] Mitigations FBI and CISA
recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential
adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to
reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware: Implement a recovery plan to
maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and
servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard
drive, storage device, the cloud). Require all accounts with password logins
(e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply
with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for
developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of
at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length. Store
passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers. Add
password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords.
Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts. Disable password
“hints.” Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per
year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of
requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are
more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals
can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible,
particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access
critical systems. Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to
date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an
organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited
vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a
vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list
can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list . Segment networks to
prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the
spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access
to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of
the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in
detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network
traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection
and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral
connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections
for each host. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for
antivirus software on all hosts. Review domain controllers, servers,
workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access
controls according to the principle of least privilege. Disable unused ports.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your
organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Implement time-based
access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-
in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can
support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero
Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable
admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct
need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process
that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they
need to support the completion of a certain task. Disable command-line and
scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral
movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If
threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty
escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. Maintain offline backups of
data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this
practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted,
and/or only have irretrievable data. Ensure all backup data is encrypted,
immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire
organization’s data infrastructure. RESOURCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-
of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware
resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-
State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide
. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware
Readiness Assessment . REPORTING FBI is seeking any information that can be
shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP
addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors,
Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an
encrypted file. FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does
not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also
embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other
criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund
illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have
decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware
incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office , or CISA at us-
cert.cisa.gov/report . DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being
provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse
any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any
reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service
mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FBI
and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics
and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their
contributions to this CSA. References [1] Palo Alto Networks: Tropical
Scorpius [2] Palo Alto Networks: Novel News on Cuba Ransomware – Greetings
From Tropical Scorpius [3] BlackBerry: Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor
Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries [4] BlackBerry: RomCom
Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially
the United Kingdom Revisions December 1, 2022: Initial Version December 12,
2022: Added new IP addresses and IOCs This product is provided subject to this
Notification and this Privacy & Use policy.Original release date: December 1, 2022 | Last revised: January 5, 2023
Summary Actions to take today to mitigate cyber threats from ransomware: •
Prioritize remediating known exploited vulnerabilities . • Train users to
recognize and report phishing attempts . • Enable and enforce phishing-
resistant multifactor authentication. Note: This joint Cybersecurity Advisory
(CSA) is part of an ongoing #StopRansomware effort to publish advisories for
network defenders that detail various ransomware variants and ransomware
threat actors. These #StopRansomware advisories include recently and
historically observed tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and
indicators of compromise (IOCs) to help organizations protect against
ransomware. Visit stopransomware.gov to see all #StopRansomware advisories and
to learn more about other ransomware threats and no-cost resources. The FBI
and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) are releasing
this joint CSA to disseminate known Cuba ransomware IOCs and TTPs associated
with Cuba ransomware actors identified through FBI investigations, third-party
reporting, and open-source reporting. This advisory updates the December 2021
FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware . Note:
While this ransomware is known by industry as “Cuba ransomware,” there is no
indication Cuba ransomware actors have any connection or affiliation with the
Republic of Cuba. Since the release of the December 2021 FBI Flash, the number
of U.S. entities compromised by Cuba ransomware has doubled, with ransoms
demanded and paid on the increase. This year, Cuba ransomware actors have
added to their TTPs, and third-party and open-source reports have identified a
possible link between Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom Remote Access Trojan
(RAT) actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware actors. FBI and CISA encourage
organizations to implement the recommendations in the Mitigations section of
this CSA to reduce the likelihood and impact of Cuba ransomware and other
ransomware operations. Download the PDF version of this report: pdf, 649 kb .
For a downloadable copy of IOCs, see: AA22-335A.stix (STIX 148 kb). (Updated
December 12, 2022) AA22-335A-2.stix (STIX, 67 kb). (End of Update.) Technical
Details Overview Since the December 2021 release of FBI Flash: Indicators of
Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware , FBI has observed Cuba ransomware
actors continuing to target U.S. entities in the following five critical
infrastructure sectors : Financial Services, Government Facilities, Healthcare
and Public Health, Critical Manufacturing, and Information Technology. As of
August 2022, FBI has identified that Cuba ransomware actors have: Compromised
101 entities, 65 in the United States and 36 outside the United States.
Demanded 145 million U.S. Dollars (USD) and received 60 million USD in ransom
payments. Cuba Ransomware Actors’ Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures As
previously reported by FBI, Cuba ransomware actors have leveraged the
following techniques to gain initial access into dozens of entities in
multiple critical infrastructure sectors: Known vulnerabilities in commercial
software [T1190 ] Phishing campaigns [T1566 ] Compromised credentials [T1078 ]
Legitimate remote desktop protocol (RDP) tools [T1563.002 ] After gaining
initial access, the actors distributed Cuba ransomware on compromised systems
through Hancitor —a loader known for dropping or executing stealers, such as
Remote Access Trojans (RATs) and other types of ransomware, onto victims’
networks. Since spring 2022, Cuba ransomware actors have modified their TTPs
and tools to interact with compromised networks and extort payments from
victims.[1 ],[2 ] Cuba ransomware actors have exploited known vulnerabilities
and weaknesses and have used tools to elevate privileges on compromised
systems. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42,[2 ] Cuba ransomware actors
have: Exploited CVE-2022-24521 in the Windows Common Log File System (CLFS)
driver to steal system tokens and elevate privileges. Used a PowerShell script
to identify and target service accounts for their associated Active Directory
Kerberos ticket. The actors then collected and cracked the Kerberos tickets
offline via Kerberoasting [T1558.003 ]. Used a tool, called KerberCache, to
extract cached Kerberos tickets from a host’s Local Security Authority Server
Service (LSASS) memory [T1003.001 ]. Used a tool to exploit CVE-2020-1472
(also known as “ZeroLogon”) to gain Domain Administrative privileges [T1068 ].
This tool and its intrusion attempts have been reportedly related to Hancitor
and Qbot. According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors use
tools to evade detection while moving laterally through compromised
environments before executing Cuba ransomware. Specifically, the actors,
“leveraged a dropper that writes a kernel driver to the file system called
ApcHelper.sys . This targets and terminates security products. The dropper was
not signed; however, the kernel driver was signed using the certificate found
in the LAPSUS NVIDIA leak.” [T1562.001 ].[2 ] In addition to deploying
ransomware, the actors have used “double extortion” techniques, in which they
exfiltrate victim data, and (1) demand a ransom payment to decrypt it and, (2)
threaten to publicly release it if a ransom payment is not made.[2 ] Cuba
Ransomware Link to RomCom and Industrial Spy Marketplace Since spring 2022,
third-party and open-source reports have identified an apparent link between
Cuba ransomware actors, RomCom RAT actors, and Industrial Spy ransomware
actors: According to Palo Alto Networks Unit 42, Cuba ransomware actors began
using RomCom malware, a custom RAT, for command and control (C2).[2 ] Cuba
ransomware actors may also be leveraging Industrial Spy ransomware. According
to third-party reporting, suspected Cuba ransomware actors compromised a
foreign healthcare company. The threat actors deployed Industrial Spy
ransomware, which shares distinct similarities in configuration to Cuba
ransomware. Before deploying the ransomware, the actors moved laterally using
Impacket and deployed the RomCom RAT and Meterpreter Reverse Shell HTTP/HTTPS
proxy via a C2 server [T1090 ]. Cuba ransomware actors initially used their
leak site to sell stolen data; however, around May 2022, the actors began
selling their data on Industrial Spy’s online market for selling stolen
data.[2 ] RomCom actors have targeted foreign military organizations, IT
companies, food brokers and manufacturers.[3 ][4 ] The actors copied
legitimate HTML code from public-facing webpages, modified the code, and then
incorporated it in spoofed domains [T1584.001 ], which allowed the RomCom
actors to: Host counterfeit Trojanized applications for SolarWinds Network
Performance Monitor (NPM), KeePass password manager, PDF Reader Pro, (by PDF
Technologies, Inc., not an Adobe Acrobat or Reader product), and Advanced IP
Scanner software; Deploy the RomCom RAT as the final stage. INDICATORS OF
COMPROMISE See tables 1 through 5 for Cuba ransomware IOCs that FBI obtained
during threat response investigations as of late August 2022. In addition to
these tables, see the publications in the References section below for aid in
detecting possible exploitation or compromise. Note: For IOCs as of early
November 2021, see FBI Flash: Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba
Ransomware . Table 1: Cuba Ransomware Associated Files and Hashes, as of Late
August 2022 File Name File Path File Hash netping.dll c:\windows\temp SHA256:
f1103e627311e73d5f29e877243e7ca203292f9419303c661aec57745eb4f26c shar.bat MD5:
4c32ef0836a0af7025e97c6253054bca SHA256:
a7c207b9b83648f69d6387780b1168e2f1eabd23ae6e162dd700ae8112f8b96c Psexesvc.exe
SHA256: 141b2190f51397dbd0dfde0e3904b264c91b6f81febc823ff0c33da980b69944 1.bat
216155s.dll 23246s.bat SHA256:
02a733920c7e69469164316e3e96850d55fca9f5f9d19a241fad906466ec8ae8 23246s.dll
SHA256: 0cf6399db55d40bc790a399c6bbded375f5a278dc57a143e4b21ea3f402f551f
23246st.dll SHA256:
f5db51115fa0c910262828d0943171d640b4748e51c9a140d06ea81ae6ea1710 259238e.exe
31-100.bat 3184.bat 3184.dll 45.dll SHA256:
857f28b8fe31cf5db6d45d909547b151a66532951f26cda5f3320d2d4461b583 4ca736d.exe
62e2e37.exe 64.235.39.82 64s.dll 7z.sfx 7zCon.sfx 7-zip.chm 82.ps1 9479.bat
SHA256: 08eb4366fc0722696edb03981f00778701266a2e57c40cd2e9d765bf8b0a34d0
9479p.bat SHA256:
f8144fa96c036a8204c7bc285e295f9cd2d1deb0379e39ee8a8414531104dc4a 9479p.ps1
SHA256: 88d13669a994d2e04ec0a9940f07ab8aab8563eb845a9c13f2b0fec497df5b17 a.exe
MD5: 03c835b684b21ded9a4ab285e4f686a3 SHA1:
eaced2fcfdcbf3dca4dd77333aaab055345f3ab4 SHA256:
0f385cc69a93abeaf84994e7887cb173e889d309a515b55b2205805bdfe468a3 SHA256:
0d5e3483299242bf504bd3780487f66f2ec4f48a7b38baa6c6bc8ba16e4fb605 SHA256:
7e00bfb622072f53733074795ab581cf6d1a8b4fc269a50919dda6350209913c SHA256:
af4523186fe4a5e2833bbbe14939d8c3bd352a47a2f77592d8adcb569621ce02 a220.bat
a220.dll SHA256:
8a3d71c668574ad6e7406d3227ba5adc5a230dd3057edddc4d0ec5f8134d76c3 a82.exe
SHA256: 4306c5d152cdd86f3506f91633ef3ae7d8cf0dd25f3e37bec43423c4742f4c42
a91.exe SHA256:
3d4502066a338e19df58aa4936c37427feecce9ab8d43abff4a7367643ae39ce a99.exe
SHA256: f538b035c3de87f9f8294bec272c1182f90832a4e86db1e47cbb1ab26c9f3a0b
aa.exe aa2.exe aaa.stage.16549040.dns.alleivice.com add2.exe advapi32.dll
agent.13.ps1 agent.bat SHA256:
fd87ca28899823b37b2c239fbbd236c555bcab7768d67203f86d37ede19dd975 agent.dll
agent13.bat agent13.ps1 SHA256:
1817cc163482eb21308adbd43fb6be57fcb5ff11fd74b344469190bb48d8163b agent64.bin
SHA256: bff4dd37febd5465e0091d9ea68006be475c0191bd8c7a79a44fbf4b99544ef1
agsyst121.bat agsyst121.dll all.bat SHA256:
ecefd9bb8b3783a81ab934b44eb3d84df5e58f0289f089ef6760264352cf878a all.dll
SHA256: db3b1f224aec1a7c58946d819d729d0903751d1867113aae5cca87e38c653cf4
anet.exe SHA1: 241ce8af441db2d61f3eb7852f434642739a6cc3 SHA256:
74fbf3cc44dd070bd5cb87ca2eed03e1bbeec4fec644a25621052f0a73abbe84 SHA256:
b160bd46b6efc6d79bfb76cf3eeacca2300050248969decba139e9e1cbeebf53 SHA256:
f869e8fbd8aa1f037ad862cf6e8bbbf797ff49556fb100f2197be4ee196a89ae App.exe
appnetwork.exe AppVClient.man aswSP_arPot2 aus.exe SHA256:
0c2ffed470e954d2bf22807ba52c1ffd1ecce15779c0afdf15c292e3444cf674 SHA256:
310afba59ab8e1bda3ef750a64bf39133e15c89e8c7cf4ac65ee463b26b136ba av.bat
SHA256: b5d202456ac2ce7d1285b9c0e2e5b7ddc03da1cbca51b5da98d9ad72e7f773b8
c2.ps1 c2.ps1 cdzehhlzcwvzcmcr.aspx check.exe checkk.exe checkk.txt SHA256:
1f842f84750048bb44843c277edeaa8469697e97c4dbf8dc571ec552266bec9f client32.exe
comctl32 .dll comp2.ps1 comps2.ps1 cqyrrxzhumiklndm.aspx defendercontrol.exe
ff.exe SHA256:
1b943afac4f476d523310b8e3afe7bca761b8cbaa9ea2b9f01237ca4652fc834 File
__agsyst121.dll File __aswArPot.sys File __s9239.dll File_agsyst121.dll
File_aswArPot.sys File_s9239.dll ga.exe gdi32 .dll geumspbgvvytqrih.aspx IObit
UNLOCKER.exe kavsa32.exe MD5: 236f5de8620a6255f9003d054f08574b SHA1:
9b546bd99272cf4689194d698c830a2510194722 kavsyst32.exe kernel32.dll komar.bat
SHA256: B9AFE016DBDBA389000B01CE7645E7EEA1B0A50827CDED1CBAA48FBC715197BB
komar.dll komar121.bat komar121.dll komar2.ps1 SHA256:
61971d3cbf88d6658e5209de443e212100afc8f033057d9a4e79000f6f0f7cc4 komar64.dll
SHA256: 8E64BACAF40110547B334EADCB0792BDC891D7AE298FBFFF1367125797B6036B
mfcappk32.exe newpass.ps1 SHA256:
c646199a9799b6158de419b1b7e36b46c7b7413d6c35bfffaeaa8700b2dcc427 npalll.exe
SHA256: bd270853db17f94c2b8e4bd9fa089756a147ed45cbc44d6c2b0c78f361978906
ole32.dll oleaut32.dll open.bat SHA256:
2EB3EF8A7A2C498E87F3820510752043B20CBE35B0CBD9AF3F69E8B8FE482676 open.exe
pass.ps1 SHA256:
0afed8d1b7c36008de188c20d7f0e2283251a174261547aab7fb56e31d767666
pdfdecrypt.exe powerview.ps1 prt3389.bat SHA256:
e0d89c88378dcb1b6c9ce2d2820f8d773613402998b8dcdb024858010dec72ed ra.ps1
SHA256: 571f8db67d463ae80098edc7a1a0cad59153ce6592e42d370a45df46f18a4ad8
rg1.exe Rg2.exe rundll32 s64174.bat SHA256:
10a5612044599128981cb41d71d7390c15e7a2a0c2848ad751c3da1cbec510a2 SHA256:
1807549af1c8fdc5b04c564f4026e41790c554f339514d326f8b55cb7b9b4f79 s64174.dll
s9239.bat s9239.dll shell32.dll stel.exe syskav64.exe sysra64,exe
systav332.bat SHA256:
01242b35b6def71e42cc985e97d618e2fabd616b16d23f7081d575364d09ca74
TC-9.22a.2019.3.exe TeamViewer.exe testDLL.dll tug4rigd.dll SHA256:
952b34f6370294c5a0bb122febfaa80612fef1f32eddd48a3d0556c4286b7474
UpdateNotificationPipeline.002.etl user32.dll v1.bat v2.bat v3.bat veeamp.exe
SHA256: 9aa1f37517458d635eae4f9b43cb4770880ea0ee171e7e4ad155bbdee0cbe732
version.dll vlhqbgvudfnirmzx.aspx wininet.dll wlog.exe wpeqawzp.sys
y3lcx345.dll zero.exe SHA256:
3a8b7c1fe9bd9451c0a51e4122605efc98e7e4e13ed117139a13e4749e211ed0 Table 2: Cuba
Ransomware Associated Email Addresses, as of Late August 2022 Email Provider
Email Addresses Cuba-supp [.] com admin@cuba-supp[.]com Encryption-support [.]
com admin@encryption-support[.]com Mail.supports24 [.] net
inbox@mail.supports24[.]net Table 3: Cuba Ransomware Associated Jabber
Address, as of Late August 2022 cuba_support@exploit[.]im Table 4: IP
Addresses Associated with Cuba Ransomware, as of Late August 2022 Note: Some
of these observed IP addresses are more than a year old. FBI and CISA
recommend vetting or investigating these IP addresses prior to taking forward-
looking action such as blocking. 193.23.244[.]244 144.172.83[.]13
216.45.55[.]30 94.103.9[.]79 149.255.35[.]131 217.79.43[.]148 192.137.101[.]46
154.35.175[.]225 222.252.53[.]33 92.222.172[.]39 159.203.70[.]39
23.227.198[.]246 92.222.172[.]172 171.25.193[.]9 31.184.192[.]44 10.13.102[.]1
185.153.199[.]169 37.120.247[.]39 10.13.102[.]58 192.137.100[.]96
37.44.253[.]21 10.133.78[.]41 192.137.100[.]98 38.108.119[.]121 10.14.100[.]20
192.137.101[.]205 45.164.21[.]13 103.114.163[.]197 193.34.167[.]17
45.32.229[.]66 103.27.203[.]197 194.109.206[.]212 45.86.162[.]34
104.217.8[.]100 195.54.160[.]149 45.91.83[.]176 107.189.10[.]143
199.58.81[.]140 64.52.169[.]174 108.170.31[.]115 204.13.164[.]118
64.235.39[.]82 128.31.0[.]34 209.76.253[.]84 79.141.169[.]220 128.31.0[.]39
212.192.241[.]230 84.17.52[.]135 131.188.40[.]189 213.32.39[.]43 86.59.21[.]38
141.98.87[.]124 216.45.55[.]3 Table 5: Cuba Bitcoin Wallets Receiving
Payments, as of Late August 2022 bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv
bc1qvpk8ksl3my6kjezjss9p28cqj4dmpmmjx5yl3y
bc1qhtwfcysclc7pck2y3vmjtpzkaezhcm6perc99x
bc1qft3s53ur5uq5ru6sl3zyr247dpr55mnggwucd3
bc1qp7h9fszlqxjwyfhv0upparnsgx56x7v7wfx4x7
bc1q4vr25xkth35qslenqwd7aw020w85qrvlrhv7hc
bc1q5uc0fdnz0ve5pg4nl4upa9ly586t6wmnghfe7x
bc1q6rsj3cn37dngypu5kad9gdw5ykhctpwhjvun3z
bc1q6zkemtyyrre2mkk23g93zyq98ygrygvx7z2q0t
bc1q9cj0n9k2m282x0nzj6lhqjvhkkd4h95sewek83
bc1qaselp9nhejc3safcq3vn5wautx6w33x0llk7dl
bc1qc48q628t93xwzljtvurpqhcvahvesadpwqtsza
bc1qgsuf5m9tgxuv4ylxcmx8eeqn3wmlmu7f49zkus
bc1qhpepeeh7hlz5jvrp50uhkz59lhakcfvme0w9qh
bc1qjep0vx2lap93455p7h29unruvr05cs242mrcah
bc1qr9l0gcl0nvmngap6ueyy5gqdwvm34kdmtevjyx
bc1qs3lv77udkap2enxv928x59yuact5df4t95rsqr
bc1qyd05q2m5qt3nwpd3gcqkyer0gspqx5p6evcf7h
bc1qzz7xweq8ee2j35tq6r5m687kctq9huskt50edv See figure 1 for an example of a
Cuba ransomware note. Figure 1: Sample Cuba Ransom Note 2, as of late August
2022 Greetings! Unfortunately we have to report that your company were
compromised. All your files were encrypted and you can’t restore them without
our private key. Trying to restore it without our help may cause complete loss
of your data. Also we researched whole your corporate network and downloaded
all your sensitive data to our servers. If we will not get any contact from
you in the next 3 days we will public it in our news site. You can find it
there ( https[:]//
cuba4ikm4jakjgmkeztyawtdgr2xymvy6nvgw5cglswg3si76icnqd.onion/ ) Tor Browser is
needed ( https[:]//www.torproject.org/download/ ) Also we respect your work
and time and we are open for communication. In that case we are ready to
discuss recovering your files and work. We can grant absolute privacy and
compliance with agreements by our side. Also we can provide all necessary
evidence to confirm performance of our products and statements. Feel free to
contact us with quTox ( https[:]//tox.chat/download.html ) Our ToxID:
37790E2D198DFD20C9D2887D4EF7C3E295188842480192689864DCCA3C8BD808A18956768271
Alternative method is email: inbox@mail.supports24[.]net Mark your messages
with your personal ID: Additional resources to detect possible exploitation or
compromise: Palo Alto Networks Novel News on Cuba Ransomware: Greetings From
Tropical Scorpius BlackBerry blog RomCom Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and
SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially the United Kingdom BlackBerry
blog Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian
Militaries MITRE ATT&CK; TECHNIQUES Cuba ransomware actors use the ATT&CK;
techniques listed in Table 6. Note: For details on TTPs listed in the table,
see FBI Flash Indicators of Compromise Associated with Cuba Ransomware .
Resource Development Technique Title ID Use Compromise Infrastructure: Domains
T1584.001 Cuba ransomware actors use compromised networks to conduct their
operations. Initial Access Technique Title ID Use Valid Accounts T1078 Cuba
ransomware actors have been known to use compromised credentials to get into a
victim’s network. External Remote Services T1133 Cuba ransomware actors may
leverage external-facing remote services to gain initial access to a victim’s
network. Exploit Public-Facing Application T1190 Cuba ransomware actors are
known to exploit vulnerabilities in public-facing systems. Phishing T1566 Cuba
ransomware actors have sent phishing emails to obtain initial access to
systems. Execution Technique Title ID Use Command and Scripting Interpreter:
PowerShell T1059.001 Cuba ransomware actors have used PowerShell to escalate
privileges. Software Deployment Tools T1072 Cuba ransomware actors use
Hancitor as a tool to spread malicious files throughout a victim’s network.
Privilege Escalation Technique Title ID Use Exploitation for Privilege
Escalation T1068 Cuba ransomware actors have exploited ZeroLogon to gain
administrator privileges.[2 ] Defense Evasion Technique Title ID Use Impair
Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools T1562.001 Cuba ransomware actors leveraged a
loader that disables security tools within the victim network. Lateral
Movement Technique Title ID Use Remote Services Session: RDP Hijacking
T1563.002 Cuba ransomware actors used RDP sessions to move laterally.
Credential Access Technique Title ID Use Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory
T1003.001 Cuba ransomware actors use LSASS memory to retrieve stored
compromised credentials. Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets: Kerberoasting
T1558.003 Cuba ransomware actors used the Kerberoasting technique to identify
service accounts linked to active directory.[2 ] Command and Control Technique
Title ID Use Proxy: Manipulate Command and Control Communications T1090
Industrial Spy ransomware actors use HTTP/HTTPS proxy via a C2 server to
direct traffic to avoid direct connection. [2 ] Mitigations FBI and CISA
recommend network defenders apply the following mitigations to limit potential
adversarial use of common system and network discovery techniques and to
reduce the risk of compromise by Cuba ransomware: Implement a recovery plan to
maintain and retain multiple copies of sensitive or proprietary data and
servers in a physically separate, segmented, and secure location (i.e., hard
drive, storage device, the cloud). Require all accounts with password logins
(e.g., service account, admin accounts, and domain admin accounts) to comply
with National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) standards for
developing and managing password policies. Use longer passwords consisting of
at least 8 characters and no more than 64 characters in length. Store
passwords in hashed format using industry-recognized password managers. Add
password user “salts” to shared login credentials. Avoid reusing passwords.
Implement multiple failed login attempt account lockouts. Disable password
“hints.” Refrain from requiring password changes more frequently than once per
year. Note: NIST guidance suggests favoring longer passwords instead of
requiring regular and frequent password resets. Frequent password resets are
more likely to result in users developing password “patterns” cyber criminals
can easily decipher. Require administrator credentials to install software.
Require multifactor authentication for all services to the extent possible,
particularly for webmail, virtual private networks, and accounts that access
critical systems. Keep all operating systems, software, and firmware up to
date. Timely patching is one of the most efficient and cost-effective steps an
organization can take to minimize its exposure to cybersecurity threats.
Prioritize patching SonicWall firewall vulnerabilities and known exploited
vulnerabilities in internet-facing systems. Note: SonicWall maintains a
vulnerability list that includes Advisory ID, CVE, and mitigation. Their list
can be found at psirt.global.sonicwall.com/vuln-list . Segment networks to
prevent the spread of ransomware. Network segmentation can help prevent the
spread of ransomware by controlling traffic flows between—and access
to—various subnetworks and by restricting adversary lateral movement.
Identify, detect, and investigate abnormal activity and potential traversal of
the indicated ransomware with a networking monitoring tool. To aid in
detecting the ransomware, implement a tool that logs and reports all network
traffic, including lateral movement activity on a network. Endpoint detection
and response (EDR) tools are particularly useful for detecting lateral
connections as they have insight into common and uncommon network connections
for each host. Install, regularly update, and enable real time detection for
antivirus software on all hosts. Review domain controllers, servers,
workstations, and active directories for new and/or unrecognized accounts.
Audit user accounts with administrative privileges and configure access
controls according to the principle of least privilege. Disable unused ports.
Consider adding an email banner to emails received from outside your
organization. Disable hyperlinks in received emails. Implement time-based
access for accounts set at the admin level and higher. For example, the Just-
in-Time (JIT) access method provisions privileged access when needed and can
support enforcement of the principle of least privilege (as well as the Zero
Trust model). JIT sets a network-wide policy in place to automatically disable
admin accounts at the Active Directory level when the account is not in direct
need. Individual users may submit their requests through an automated process
that grants them access to a specified system for a set timeframe when they
need to support the completion of a certain task. Disable command-line and
scripting activities and permissions. Privilege escalation and lateral
movement often depend on software utilities running from the command line. If
threat actors are not able to run these tools, they will have difficulty
escalating privileges and/or moving laterally. Maintain offline backups of
data, and regularly maintain backup and restoration. By instituting this
practice, the organization ensures they will not be severely interrupted,
and/or only have irretrievable data. Ensure all backup data is encrypted,
immutable (i.e., cannot be altered or deleted), and covers the entire
organization’s data infrastructure. RESOURCES Stopransomware.gov is a whole-
of-government approach that gives one central location for ransomware
resources and alerts. Resource to mitigate a ransomware attack: CISA-Multi-
State Information Sharing and Analysis Center (MS-ISAC) Joint Ransomware Guide
. No-cost cyber hygiene services: Cyber Hygiene Services and Ransomware
Readiness Assessment . REPORTING FBI is seeking any information that can be
shared, to include boundary logs showing communication to and from foreign IP
addresses, a sample ransom note, communications with ransomware actors,
Bitcoin wallet information, decryptor files, and/or a benign sample of an
encrypted file. FBI and CISA do not encourage paying ransom as payment does
not guarantee victim files will be recovered. Furthermore, payment may also
embolden adversaries to target additional organizations, encourage other
criminal actors to engage in the distribution of ransomware, and/or fund
illicit activities. Regardless of whether you or your organization have
decided to pay the ransom, FBI and CISA urge you to promptly report ransomware
incidents immediately. Report to a local FBI Field Office , or CISA at us-
cert.cisa.gov/report . DISCLAIMER The information in this report is being
provided “as is” for informational purposes only. FBI and CISA do not endorse
any commercial product or service, including any subjects of analysis. Any
reference to specific commercial products, processes, or services by service
mark, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not constitute or imply
endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by FBI or CISA. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS FBI
and CISA would like to thank BlackBerry, ESET, The National Cyber-Forensics
and Training Alliance (NCFTA), Palo Alto Networks, and PRODAFT for their
contributions to this CSA. References [1] Palo Alto Networks: Tropical
Scorpius [2] Palo Alto Networks: Novel News on Cuba Ransomware – Greetings
From Tropical Scorpius [3] BlackBerry: Unattributed RomCom Threat Actor
Spoofing Popular Apps Now Hits Ukrainian Militaries [4] BlackBerry: RomCom
Threat Actor Abuses KeePass and SolarWinds to Target Ukraine and Potentially
the United Kingdom Revisions December 1, 2022: Initial Version December 12,
2022: Added new IP addresses and IOCs This product is provided subject to this
Notification and this Privacy & Use policy. December 01 2022 12:04:01
AA22-335A: #StopRansomware: Cuba Ransomware

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